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Executive Summary
Cross-border electricity trading (CBET) can reduce costs, improve reliability, and reduce emissions for all participating countries. Regulatory coordination is essential to making CBET successful for all participating countries. For Bangladesh, expanding CBET mechanisms could expand access to hydropower from Nepal and other resources that could supplement the country's diminishing natural gas reserves cost-effectively. This report maps the regulatory issues Bangladesh might address if it elects to develop a national strategy for CBET with its neighbors in South Asia.
CBET can take one of three general forms. Each form raises different sets of regulatory issues and involves different levels of cross-border coordination. CBET types include:
• Tenant generation, in which a generator exports power to another country over a dedicated cross-border transmission line with little or no connection to the host country's system • A bilateral contract, where power moves through both national networks and across transmission interfaces linking the two grids • An integrated market exchange where cross-border trades and all other power flows are optimized simultaneously over multiple networks.
These three models vary with respect to new transmission and operational coordination between two countries. Improvements to dispatch and ancillary service procurement can also differ. India is evaluating major market reforms that could accelerate CBET. Regulators proposed these reforms in 2018 to address inefficiencies in India's wholesale power markets; however, if ultimately adopted, the reforms could accommodate CBET with India's neighbors. The development of a South Asian wholesale power market based on security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) could significantly enhance opportunities for CBET, including power transfers between Nepal and Bangladesh.
viii Bangladesh's opportunities for successful CBET depend on strategic coordination across national policy, regulation, and power system planning. A key question for national policy will be whether to participate in the Indian wholesale market reforms, if and when India permanently enacts them. More generally, national policy provides authoritative guidance on how Bangladesh balances CBET goals with other national goals. One area that might benefit from policy clarity is guidance on how regulators should balance energy independence with the economic benefits of regional interdependence. The guidance could include the identification of critical thresholds for measures such as imported electricity and domestic service disruptions that are due to insufficient power supplies. Bangladesh and India already have experience trading power, with some 1,160 MW of interconnection capacity as of 2019 as well as a stated intent by both countries to build additional transmission capacity.
National policy, in turn, affects the creation of rules and other regulatory decisions. Regulatory issues for all types of CBET might include:
• Accounting for CBET in standards for approving new transmission • Guidelines for allocating the cost of new transmission intended to enable CBET • Reporting requirements (e.g., requirements for sales, purchases, curtailments, cost of energy paid for but not taken).
For bilateral agreements and integrated markets, rules might also include:
• Whether to allow large customers to switch service from the traditional utility to an alternative provider • Methods for assessing whether wholesale power prices are reasonable and competitive.
For integrated markets, rules might include:
• Registration of Bangladesh entities that will participate in CBET • Application of standards for scheduling, accounting, metering, and settlement • Dispute resolution processes.
Governance, which is different from jurisdictional authority, could be important to the success of a South Asia integrated wholesale power market. A well-crafted governance structure would provide the governments of Bangladesh, Nepal, and other participating countries with an avenue of regular formal input on matters affecting the shared market, even if ultimate regulatory authority remains with India's Central Electricity Regulatory Commission. Most regional transmission organizations (RTOs) in the United States have a comparable governance structure. In the United States, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has jurisdiction over the RTO tariff, but the RTO itself has several stakeholder committees organized under a governing board. In most cases, state regulators are members of a special committee that provides executive-level policy input to the RTO board. Wholesale power markets evolve over time, and Bangladesh's success in achieving beneficial CBET could be aided by tracking indicators of market outcomes. Monitoring prices and trading activity can provide public accountability for CBET policies. It could also provide early signs of the need for midcourse corrections in specific regulations.
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Introduction
Greater cross-border electricity trading (CBET) can benefit customers throughout South Asia. Limited trading already takes place, but Bangladesh, Nepal, and India have signaled interest in increasing the commercial flow of electricity among them. However, harmonizing policies on both sides of the border is crucial because poor or uncoordinated regulations can suppress CBET and jeopardize the potential public benefits. For Bangladesh, expanding CBET mechanisms could expand access to hydropower from Nepal and other resources that could supplement the country's diminishing natural gas reserves cost-effectively. The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of CBET options and the different regulatory decisions they entail, with a focus on Bangladesh.
Ideally, CBET balances two public interest goals: energy independence and cost savings through foreign trade. The early stages of national electrification normally favor energy independence with little exchange with neighboring countries. However, as the country's economic development expands to include a larger cross section of the population, keeping the price of electricity as low as possible becomes increasingly important to sustainable growth. Low electricity costs might depend on strategies enabled by CBET, such as:
• Providing greater access to low-cost generation resources, including low-emission technologies such as wind and solar • Developing high-voltage transmission corridors to reduce line losses • Pooling operating reserves across borders • Implementing regional resilience plans for speedy recovery from earthquakes, flooding, or other natural disruptions to the grid. The use of economical electricity trading can augment a country's domestic generation supply when demand is increasing significantly. Figure 1 shows how quickly electricity demand in Bangladesh has grown since 2014. In its 2010 Power System Master Plan (Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources 2010) , Bangladesh projected a capacity requirement (projected load plus reserves) of 24 gigawatts (GW) by 2021, and 40 GW by 2030. At current growth rates, Bangladesh will need an additional 2,000 MW of baseload capacity by 2022.
Bangladesh has domestic natural gas reserves, but production has failed to meet rising demand in the electricity sector. Demand from compressed natural gas used for domestic transportation contributes to shortages, as also happens in India (EIA 2015) . Some 3.7 GW of renewable energy technical potential exists in Bangladesh, mostly from utility-scale solar, wind, and biopower. However, virtually none of this potential has been developed (Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources 2016) .
Bangladesh and India have two interconnections totaling 1,160 MW of transmission capacity at 400 kV. The two countries' grids are not synchronized, so these interconnections require backto-back high-voltage direct current substations. The primary interconnection point is in the west of Bangladesh, between Baharampur and Bheramara. It was originally a 500-MW interconnection, but it was expanded to 1 GW in 2018 (Soonee and Narasimshan 2015) . Nearly all this capacity is occupied by power flow from India into Bangladesh; 250 MW is sold through a government-to-government transaction at a discounted rate, and 450 MW of Indian power is procured by the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) through long-term power supply agreements.
The second interconnection is in eastern Bangladesh, between Tripura and Comilla. This is a 160-MW interconnection, although the conduit could support 500 MW if substations were upgraded. These upgrades were originally scheduled to be completed by 2020, but Bangladesh has recently signaled they would prefer additional interconnection capacity with India in the west of the country, and are not moving forward with substation upgrades (The Daily Star 2019).
CBET is a feature of the evolving electricity sector around the world, but it does not happen on its own. Economically beneficial trading relies on strategic policies and effective regulation that aim for the right balance of public interests. It also involves cooperation among sovereign nations and agreement on matters such as the allocation of costs, mechanisms for resolving commercial disputes, technical standards, and the governance of institutions charged with operating joint markets on a shared grid.
Major electricity reforms in India could accelerate CBET in South Asia significantly. Though these proposed reforms are not certain as of this writing, they would involve considerable preparation if they are to be implemented and Bangladesh chooses to participate. India's aim is to eliminate waste and inefficiency by establishing geographically integrated market-based mechanisms for scheduling, energy dispatch, and procurement of ancillary services. In this report, we pay special attention to these reforms and their status as of this writing. Though the key driver of these reforms is India's domestic need to increase the efficiency of its own power sector, current and proposed policies appear to contain no inherent barrier to Bangladesh's participation.
CBET can take place through bilateral contracts, an integrated market with joint dispatch, or a combination of both. Under a bilateral contract, a specific supplier in one country delivers electricity to a specific customer in another country. Deals are negotiated directly between two counterparties that agree on prices, quantities, and schedules for energy delivery. In contrast, an integrated market combines many suppliers offering electricity to many customers through a power pooling arrangement. Integrated trading takes place through an automated auction platform that sets prices and determines dispatch quantities for each plant at hourly or subhourly operating intervals. The result is cost-optimized dispatch across the entire grid.
After defining CBET types, we specifically examine integrated market exchanges with joint dispatch as contemplated in India's proposed wholesale power market reforms. These markets are generally more complicated, but they are also more transparent. If extended to include CBET, these reforms could represent a new framework for South Asian utilities and CBET.
The fundamentals of integrated markets and differences in CBET types suggest foundational questions Bangladesh might consider answering as it develops its national CBET policies. The aim of this report is not to recommend answers to these questions. Rather, it is to lay out a road map of major decision points that could guide the country's policy development. How Bangladesh answers these questions would guide how it responds to the regulatory issues described in Section 5.
The report finishes with several suggestions on how Bangladesh could monitor CBET outcomes. Markets often take years to reach a point of consistent efficiency, and this could include midcourse adjustments to regulations. Monitoring would enable the government to track CBET progress and ensure regulatory policies are up to date.
Types of CBET Arrangements
CBET transaction models can differ significantly in their commercial and political characteristics. In this section, we define three categories of CBET arrangements in order of increasing regulatory complexity: tenant generation, bilateral commercial agreements, and integrated market exchanges.
Addressing each of these CBET categories on its own merits can make government policy and regulation more effective. Important factors that can differ among CBET arrangements include ownership of generation, coordination with power system operations on either side of a border, risk management, the ability of a generator to recover costs, and impacts on domestic customer electricity bills.
Tenant Generation
This type of project is built in one country primarily to serve demand in another country. Dedicated long-distance transmission lines connect the generator to the grid of the importing country with minimal connection to the grid of the host country.
From the viewpoint of the importing country's utility and grid operator, a tenant generator on the other side of the border is operationally the same as a domestic generator. The plant is subject to the importing utility's rules for scheduling, commitment, dispatch, and settlement. Congested transmission flows between the two countries have little or no effect on the delivery of power to the importing country, due to the dedicated transmission line through the host country.
The role of the host government is largely limited to site permitting and the terms of tenancy (e.g., annual lease payments and other remuneration). Neither the host country nor its grid operator has any role in the plant's scheduling, dispatch, or financial settlement. Financially, energy and capacity revenues for a tenant generator are independent of anything that happens on the host country's grid.
A tenant generator can sign bilateral agreements, participate in an integrated market, or transfer ownership to the purchasing utility. In any case, however, the country hosting the plant generally does not benefit from greater economic or operational efficiency for its grid. The benefits are mostly limited to the terms of tenancy, taxes, and local employment. A tenant project generally does little for the ability of other generators in the host country to access the market of the importing country.
Bilateral Contracts
Bilateral CBET transactions involve electricity that is scheduled and wheeled across an interconnection between two countries' power systems. The generator is connected to the grid of the exporting country, while the entity purchasing the power is connected to the grid of the importing country.
Unlike tenant generation, bilateral CBET transactions involve a moderate level of operational coordination between the two countries. Balancing-that is, the continuous task of keeping total generation equal to the sum of load and net transfers to neighboring grids-is one example of such coordination. Each country's grid operator has to ensure actual generation matches actual metered electricity demand at every moment throughout the day. Imports and exports are part of the balancing equation, as Figure 2 (next page) illustrates. The importing country and the exporting country need to have the same information about the volume and timing of electricity flows between their two systems in order for each to maintain balance. After accounting for net imports and exports, each country maintains its system balance with incremental increases or decreases to its active generation and with load management (e.g., demand response, interruptible load, and in extreme cases, load shedding).
Bilateral exchanges are commercially independent of one another. The agreement between one buyer and one seller does not directly affect the price, quantity, or timing of another agreement between two other counterparties. Only when transmission congestion restricts the total flow of power on the system does the grid operator have a role in changing the amount of electricity moving under a bilateral agreement.
Government policies such as import tariffs, taxes, and regulations can create additional costs that counterparties account for when they enter into a bilateral agreement. Such policies tend to be nondiscriminatory, in that they are universally applicable to any deal between two eligible counterparties. Policies might weigh favorably or unfavorably, but it is nevertheless up to the counterparties to decide whether the agreement ultimately benefits both sides.
Barriers to bilateral CBET can include ownership requirements, import tariffs, government requirements for generation to come from domestic resources, or a lack of harmonization in regulations governing grid operations.
Integrated Market Exchanges
An integrated market optimizes unit dispatch and pricing across the region, so that load is continually met by the least-cost resources. It relies on energy offers from generators, updated load forecasts, and software that computes market outcomes many times throughout the day.
Bilateral CBET deals are independent of one another and can be as numerous as the market will bear; an integrated market is the opposite. Unit dispatch and pricing are determined simultaneously for all load and all generation within the market footprint. A generator can submit an offer to provide a certain quantity of power at a certain price, but neither the dispatch quantity nor the price will be known to the generator until the market actually clears (i.e., until all offers are processed by the market software to produce a least-cost solution).
Many integrated markets use security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) to clear the market every hour or in some cases every five minutes. SCED is a computerized generator selection process that exactly matches the least-cost portfolio of generators to the amount of load expected for an operating interval without violating the thermal limits of any transmission line in the network. In many markets, SCED runs for every hour of the next operating day to determine which generators are started and what their set points (operating levels) will be each hour. SCED can also run in real time to resolve imbalances between actual generation and actual load.
An international border that runs through an integrated market area has virtually no impact on how the market clears. What distinguishes one generator from another is the marginal cost of generation, the quantity of power available, transmission limits from the generator to the grid, and operational qualities such as ramp rate. Total generation managed separately in each country (increases and decreases from balancing reserves)
Figure 2. Moderate coordination: Bilateral CBET with separate balancing in each country
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Combining load, bilateral exchanges, and generation across both countries results in a smaller net imbalance that is easier and less costly to resolve. Figure 3 illustrates how balancing is more efficient in an integrated market. First, combining imbalances across several countries (or control areas within a country) often results in a smaller aggregated imbalance: negative and positive imbalances offset one another when combined. Second, this smaller imbalance can be resolved by drawing on a larger number of generators from which the least-cost option can be selected.
Integrated markets and bilateral trading are both driven by the market fundamentals of supply and demand. In bilateral deals, visibility into these fundamentals are a function of knowledge held by the counterparties. In an integrated market, on the other hand, prices form with fuller information about supply, demand, and value across the region.
No government has a hand in determining the quantity or price of electricity traded, but a government may approve participation by utilities, generators, and other entities under its jurisdiction. In addition, participating governments may discuss market rules to ensure they are nondiscriminatory, are transparent, and promote economically efficient price formation.
Participating in an integrated market involves more regulatory steps by the government and more coordination between governments. Integration significantly changes many of the assumptions behind regulating the power sector. The public interest is less concerned with setting prices that are just and reasonable; it is more concerned with ensuring pricing, dispatch, and other decisions are based on fair, transparent, economically efficient, and consistent processes.
Key Differences of the Three CBET Types
With respect to policy and regulation, the major types of CBET involve different levels of coordination among neighboring countries. Operational issues include generation scheduling, dispatch, and procurement of ancillary services. The types can also differ with respect to the need for new transmission investment and how it is evaluated. Table 1 summarizes some of the key characteristics of integrated markets in comparison to tenant generation and bilateral contracts. 
Government-to-Government Transactions
Government-to-government exchanges are driven by diplomatic goals. They differ from tenant generation, bilateral commercial agreements, and integrated markets in that the governments themselves are the counterparties.
One significant characteristic of government-to-government agreements is that they are outside the market. They do not necessarily follow fundamental power sector economics of supply, demand, and price formation (otherwise the transaction would not require government initiation).
In the case of hydropower, government objectives that are important but outside power sector economics might include irrigation and flood control.
Government-to-government agreements may involve government-financed infrastructure. In the Mahakali Treaty of 1996, for example, the governments of Nepal and India agreed in principle to build a multipurpose water project on the portion of the Mahakali/Sharda River forming part of the border between the two countries (Ministry of Water Resources 1996) . Power generation would be divided equally between Nepal and India, similar to how the United States and Mexico share the production of two hydropower projects the countries built on the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo. Nepal and India resumed talks in 2018 and started work on a new detailed project report that envisions a generating capacity of 6,480 MW (Hindustan Times 2018).
This report sets aside government-to-government transactions as a model for CBET. Each agreement is guided by a unique set of government objectives and does not necessarily form a precedent for future CBET policy. Public interest goals outside the bounds of other types of CBET transactions would make comparisons inapplicable.
Indian Market Reforms and Opportunities for CBET
Market reforms in India could open new opportunities for CBET across South Asia. The reforms, proposed in 2018 in a series of discussion papers issued by India's Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), aim to address major inefficiencies that India has with its own system. Though they are not aimed specifically at creating a CBET platform, the reforms represent a movement toward integrated markets that could, as a byproduct, enhance CBET.
Drivers for Reform in India
India's power grid began as a collection of separate state systems with limited connections among them. Consequently, India's electricity procurement and planning practices were largely uncoordinated across states and regions. Individual state-owned distribution companies were responsible for their own power scheduling, and many of these practices continue today. States may schedule their generation between an assortment of long-term electricity contracts with generators within the state, bilateral short-term contracts with generators in other states, and purchases from regional bulk power markets on a day-ahead basis.
The creation of central and state electricity regulatory commissions from the 1990s onward and the formation of the Power Grid Corporation of India (a national transmission company) in the late 1980s were major milestones in the development of India's interstate transmission system. Over the next decade, the all-India network continued to evolve with open access and other tariff reforms, power exchanges, point-of-connection transmission pricing, and (in 2013) operation of the state and regional grids as a synchronous system (Forum of Regulators 2016). Today, most state distribution companies can negotiate power purchases from anywhere in India. The national transmission network can deliver power into regional markets or to individual states.
Interstate generating stations (ISGSs) are generators with ownership shares from two or more states. An ISGS declares its available generation for the next day to its regional load dispatch center, which then allocates the available capacity to states within the region based on shares and contracts. State distribution companies may purchase their allocation from the ISGS, sell it to someone else through bilateral contracts or on power market, or release the allocation and allow the ISGS to sell it on a power market (CERC 2018c). Some ISGS have as many 15 beneficiaries in various Indian states, while some states receive power from more than 40 ISGSs (CERC 2019a). Additionally, each state schedules its own resources along with these ISGSs to meet its demand. Though this system allows for some level of state and regional optimization, lack of coordination between the states, the large number of long-term bilateral contracts, and the uncertainty of when capacity is released all prevent economically optimal dispatch.
Market-Based Economic Dispatch
The The MCP is the lowest price that will provide exactly enough energy to meet demand for a specific market period, based on the energy offers submitted for the period; this is called clearing the market and it represents the intersection of available supply and demand as illustrated in Figure 4 . 1 All generators offering energy at or below the MCP would be selected for dispatch and would receive the MCP as compensation. Offers priced higher than the MCP would not be dispatched and would not be paid.
Under MBED, generators with capacity not already obligated through long-term contracts would offer their power into a single, national day-ahead market. Similar to power markets in the United States and Europe, generators would be able to select the price of their bid for various time blocks at different quantities. 2 Generation is scheduled and dispatched in merit order of bid prices and subject to technical restrictions, such as the unit's ramp rate and thermal limits on transmission lines.
The market operator would also simultaneously run energy and ancillary service markets and would utilize co-optimization to ensure the most economic suite of resources for each market is selected. Additionally, the market operator is proposing a national real-time market to coordinate and optimize energy purchases at the time of delivery before falling back on ancillary services for procurement shortfalls. While SCED governs the physical dispatch of the participating federally owned ISGSs, the plants' long-term bilateral contracts or power purchase agreements (PPAs) are still in force. The contracted prices on these PPAs are often different from the MCPs that clear through SCED. To grandfather these plants into the new framework, government regulators suggest that distribution companies and generators negotiate new bilateral arrangements to hedge against the variability in MCPs and to share the potential cost savings. Scheduling and dispatching of power would still be decided through SCED, but differences between MCPs and the contracted price should be shared among state utilities and ISGSs (CERC 2019c).
SCED Pilot Project
International experience shows that healthy markets often have several forms of hedging mechanisms to balance the potential volatility and savings of day-ahead markets. Therefore, additional hedging instruments might appear in the Indian context.
CBET Implications
India's primary objective for reform is to move away from its current patchwork of contracts, markets, and operational norms to a model that is economically and electrically efficient. An efficient all-India wholesale power market could create significant savings across the entire Indian economy, so the stakes are high.
For Bangladesh, the implications of India's market reforms could include the ability to buy hydropower from Nepal with minimal investment in new transmission. It could also provide access to large-scale wind and solar development areas in India, which could complement the development of Bangladesh's domestic renewable resources at a time of high demand growth.
Efficient markets operate on the principle of nondiscriminatory access; therefore, market participants in neighboring countries might well expect the same treatment as market participants located in any Indian state. Indeed, India's Ministry of Power generally affirmed the principle of nondiscriminatory access in its 2018 guidelines on foreign participation (Government of India 2018).
The market reforms would not preclude tenant generation or bilateral CBET contracts, but they would provide more supply alternatives that would potentially be more cost-effective. Moving Nepal hydropower to Bangladesh illustrates some of the choices:
• Under the tenant generator model, a dedicated transmission line running 500 kilometers from eastern Nepal to central Bangladesh might add billions of dollars to the cost of a hydropower project, assuming no major siting problems in Nepal, India, or Bangladesh. 3 The Bangladesh grid would continue to schedule and balance using its existing resources.
• Under a traditional bilateral contract using Indian state grid systems, power delivery would incur four sets of transmission charges for Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Indian states of Bihar and West Bengal. Delivery would also be subject to the system transmission losses on each network. • Connecting to India's interstate grid and participating in an integrated market would result in a single transmission charge. It would also allow more supply options, as the hydropower generator supplying Bangladesh would not necessarily have to be in eastern Nepal if it is connected to the Indian interstate grid. The transmission loss factor applicable to India's interstate grid would apply, but this loss would be less than the aggregate losses on lower-voltage state grids. Nepal and Bangladesh would also be able to use India's MBED markets to reduce the cost of balancing and ancillary services.
An analysis of South Asia CBET scenarios conducted by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) found that increasing market integration among India, Nepal, and Bangladesh would tend to reduce the overall cost of generation and potentially provide savings benefits to ratepayers (McBennett et al. 2019) . One scenario in that analysis tested a fully integrated market comprising Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Indian states of Bihar, West Bengal, Jharkand, and Odisha; and in that scenario, cost per megawatt-hour (MWh) fell by more than 6% inside the integrated market, and costs for the rest of India fell slightly as net transfers from Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal to the rest of India increased more than 4%.
As India's reforms evolve on its interstate system, CBET with other countries connecting to that system will likely become more liquid and more cost-effective. Additionally, economically efficient transactions from Nepal to Bangladesh, for example, would be pooled on the interstate transmission system using India's integrated market. 4
But participating in an integrated market would involve other transaction costs that would not be present with a simple tenant generator or a bilateral contract approach. Market readiness would require time and money, as explained in Section 3.5. Market participants would need to dedicate personnel to take part in stakeholder committees involved in market development.
Stages of Market Integration
Participating in an integrated market requires advance preparation by regulatory authorities, the grid operator, and the market entities themselves. An integrated electricity market is the most complicated, but many of the steps also apply to bilateral trading. The first stage is readiness, or the technical capacity to buy or sell power via the market platform. Second is the development and acceptance of common rules applicable to all participants. Third is actual participation in the market with offers to provide and bids to take electricity. 
Readiness
Market readiness is the advance preparation that each participant needs to complete to ensure the accurate and timely flow of information. Each market participant-generator, load-serving entity, or power trader-is responsible for accurately translating its intent into the language of the market.
Among the items included in market readiness are:
• Validation of metering, accounting, and settlement standards, including those for hardware, software, and procedures • The ability to comply with daily schedules, including gate closures (e.g., deadlines for submitting final bids to buy and offers to sell) • Application of the interconnection standards used by the system operator • Telemetry protocols for communications with generators • Minimum technical qualifications for various ancillary services (e.g., response times, ramp rate, and sustained delivery) • For bid-based integrated markets, adoption of data formats used for submitting generation offers, commitment schedules, and next-day load forecasts.
India's Forum of Regulators published a report in 2016 listing best practices for scheduling, accounting, metering, and settlement of transactions (SAMAST) that aimed to standardize procedures across all Indian states. The group developed these guidelines in anticipation of market reforms within India (Forum of Regulators 2016). The 25 points in the Forum's readiness checklist 5 include assessments of metering, load forecasting, interchange scheduling, power pool accounting, adequacy of human resources, computation of transmission losses, and procedures for clearing debits and credits within the pool. Major market-wide changes can take longer, however. In the United States, the market in Texas took about seven years to transition from a zonal market to a full nodal market. This included a "test flight" period during which both the old and the new systems operated in parallel, with actual market settlement shifting to the new system once all validations were complete. 6
Common Rules and Protocols
An important aspect of market readiness is compliance with rules that all other market participants follow. These rules evolve over time, however. This means that even after completing the readiness stage, a market participant needs to remain informed about how the market is performing overall and about new rules and protocols to improve that performance.
Common rules can include procedures for reporting unit outages, formulas for determining ancillary service obligations, assignment of transmission costs, timelines for providing unit operating schedules to the grid operator, penalties for uninstructed deviations from schedules, payment formulas for operator-instructed changes from scheduled generation, and financial settlement schedules. Though the price of energy is a matter of negotiation (in the case of bilateral deals) or SCED optimization (in the case of integrated markets), items such as a unit's capacity value involve a formula applied across the market. In many cases, the rules are not controversial and can be set without the need for regulatory approval.
For a market to operate efficiently, rules need to be:
• Nondiscriminatory: Any market participant can expect to be treated as any other market participant in the application of any rule governing market operation. • Nonarbitrary: Often, specific procedures and responses are expressed as equations that use market data or other performance measures as inputs. The aim is to reduce to a minimum the need for discretionary decisions by the grid operator. • Transparent: The means by which any rule takes effect, regardless of how detailed it may be, are known to all market participants. This includes open access to stakeholder decision processes and accountability for outcomes.
Most integrated markets have two levels of governance. At the top is the governmental entity with legal jurisdiction over the market, its system operator, and its participants. The jurisdictional authority authorizes the initial formation of the market and its guiding principles of operation; however, regulatory decision-making processes are often too cumbersome for operational details. These fine-tuning protocols are often delegated to a structured stakeholder process. Market participants engage directly in the review of existing rules and the formulation of new ones. If stakeholders cannot reach agreement on an operational rule, the jurisdictional entity makes the ultimate determination.
In the United States, for example, most RTOs are under the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which reviews and approves the RTO's master tariff governing market operations. The FERC-approved tariff includes provisions for creating an RTO governing board and stakeholder processes, which constitute a second level of governance.
Most RTOs have stakeholder groups that serve as working forums for problems and market improvements. With RTO staff support, these stakeholder groups propose modifications to protocols for grid operations, market operations, and other rules that eventually go to the governing board for approval. Board decisions involving major policy changes then go to FERC for final review and approval. Changes to technical rules can be implemented by the governing board, with FERC acting as appeal body if there are any challenges to the technical change.
Therefore, an ongoing aspect of market participation is the ability to participate in stakeholder processes. Generally, each segment of participants-generation owners, load-serving entities, transmission utilities, power marketers, consumer representatives, and, in some cases, even environmental interests-will have its own caucus for discussing the group's common interests. And each stakeholder group will then have one representative to working groups, committees, and the organization's governing board.
Participation
Only after they are market-ready and rule-compliant can a buyer or seller engage in energy transactions.
Settlement is the process of paying generators and billing load based on valid market prices. A market uses one of two approaches for pricing: pay-as-bid or MCP. Both approaches select the lowest-cost portfolio of generation resources. Under pay-as-bid, each selected resource receives its offer price for the energy it provides. Procurements through a request for proposals and periodic auctions are typically paid as bid.
The selection of pay-as-bid or MCP is a market design decision that applies to everyone. Most integrated markets use MCPs as the basis for setting hourly energy prices. Pay-as-bid is the de facto pricing approach when CBET is a collection of independently negotiated bilateral agreements.
Both pricing approaches incentivize generators to offer energy into the market based on their marginal cost of generation. Doing otherwise-that is, submitting a higher offer price-reduces the likelihood that the offer would be accepted and paid. The MCP approach, however, enables most generators (other than the "marginal generator" whose offer has set the MCP) to earn a profit. The likely profit margin of MCPs above marginal cost informs a generation developer's decision to build new capacity.
Governance
Using India's market reforms as a vehicle for enhanced regional CBET could require special attention to market governance. "Governance" refers to a market's permanent stakeholder structure, and not the regulatory body with authority over market participants. The stakeholder process is the main forum for investigating problems involving operations and market rules. The governance structure defines what happens to solutions coming out of the stakeholder processwhether they are sent to the regulatory body as a petition, or implemented directly if they are within the scope of previous orders from the regulator.
A South Asian market might have issues similar to those faced by some regional transmission organizations (RTOs) in the United States, where market operations affect the energy policies of many state governments, but regulatory jurisdiction over the RTO is assigned by law to the federal government. In the case of South Asia, the question would be how the sovereign governments of participating nations might have a role in common market structures that affect their electricity sectors. One possible model, which is used in several U.S. RTOs, is a governmental council that provides special executive-level input into decisions by the RTO's governing board. The council is one part of a permanent stakeholder process. Figure 6 illustrates governance generally. At the apex of the stakeholder process is a governing board that answers to the regulator. Below the governing board are permanent committees and subcommittees comprising representatives of all stakeholder groups. The council of affected governments may advise the board of their support for or opposition to a change in market operations or policy. Once the board takes action and sends a petition to the regulator, the regulator can give weight to whether the board sufficiently considered issues raised by affected governments, as might be required by the laws that define the regulator's authority.
Foundational Issues of National Policy
The CBET models outlined in this report have implications for public policies at many levels of government. Here, we frame the key issues as threshold questions: bedrock policy decisions to guide later decisions about details. Among the most important decisions of national policy are the assignment of regulatory authority and the clarification of which agencies are empowered to address which specific areas. Bangladesh's national assembly may elect to address pertinent questions like those below as part of legislation addressing CBET. Preamble language to international CBET agreements could also provide basic guidance.
General Clarifications
General clarifications might include the following:
• Should CBET be isolated from other bilateral trade issues?
• What tests should Bangladesh use to balance energy independence with mutually beneficial interdependence? 7 • Which entities should regulate which aspects of CBET? 8 • What market-making functions are needed and who should provide them? 9
Clarifications Regarding MBED
Questions to clarify Bangladesh's participation in India's MBED markets include the following:
• What types of entities under Bangladesh jurisdiction should be authorized to participate in India's MBED markets as these markets evolve? 
Regulatory Issues
Strategic expansion of CBET would involve coordination of several policy areas. Some of these policies might require legislation, and many would involve implementation and oversight by national regulatory agencies.
Bangladesh's ability to participate in CBET of any type is bounded by its national policies on foreign trade. Therefore, a review of national statutes and executive orders on foreign trade could be an important step in ensuring CBET outcomes are in Bangladesh's public interest. Such a review could identify potential conflicts in legislative intent, complementary policies, and clarifications of statutory authority. Key areas include rules governing foreign ownership of assets, trade tariffs, and financial requirements governing the use of foreign currencies.
The Indian Ministry of Power (2018a) provided new guidelines on for cross border electricity trading in late 2018 that provide a framework for tripartite power trading-wheeling power over India's grid between Bangladesh and Nepal, for example. Such deals need not involve an Indian company, but they must secure political approval from a designated authority appointed by the Indian Ministry of Power.
India has a plan for a regional power corridor connecting its eastern region and its isolated northeastern region, along with Bangladesh and potentially Bhutan. The plan, which includes a major transmission line across northern Bangladesh, would require regulatory consent from Bangladesh (Hossain 2014) . To date, this proposal has had little consensus on who would operate the regional transmission lines. India has offered to manage the system, while Bangladesh has insisted on playing a role. How to divide regulatory responsibilities will likely require further negotiations between Bangladesh and India (United News of Bangladesh 2018).
Similarly, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation includes a plan for a South Asian transcontinental electricity grid encompassing India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka (Ministry of Power 2018b). The interconnection is included in a memorandum of understanding on electricity trade across the region. However, several technical, economic, and governance barriers are unresolved.
Regulatory Actions
The first step is to identify Bangladesh regulations that would apply to CBET and resolve potential overlaps in jurisdiction. Relevant bodies include the Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission (BERC), which oversees tariffs for power purchases by distribution utilities and might be tasked with approving power supply contracts involving CBET. In addition, the Power Grid Company of Bangladesh serves as the system operator for the national grid, managing congestion and charging distribution companies wheeling fees approved by the government of Bangladesh through executive orders. Finally, the BPDB procures additional generation capacity on behalf of the government from power supply contracts or through the development of selfowned projects.
The regulatory areas listed in the following sections (5.1.1-5.1.3) are grouped by their applicability to different types of CBET.
Actions Applicable to Only Integrated Market Participation (MBED) Registration of MBED Market Participants in Bangladesh:
Authorizing Bangladesh entities to participate in MBED is a basic regulatory step. Assuming (1) national policy endorses participation in MBED and (2) the law clarifies jurisdiction over the Bangladesh-domiciled entities participating in MBED, registration would help the government ensure MBED participation remains consistent with Bangladesh's national interest. Registration requirements could include proof of creditworthiness, disclosure of ownership (including foreign ownership shares), qualifications of executive management, geographic areas of operation, and recent financial statements. The government could also set bonding requirements. The agency serving as the legal registration agent for market participants in Bangladesh would be the country's lead oversight agency dealing with counterparts in India and other participating countries.
Application of SAMAST to Entities in Bangladesh Participating in MBED:
India's state electricity regulators have agreed on common SAMAST standards for their own interstate electricity exchanges. MBED market participants in Bangladesh might need to follow these same standards or risk higher transaction costs. However, because Bangladesh entities would be under national jurisdiction, any mandatory application of standards developed by and for Indian states would require an exercise of authority by the government of Bangladesh. This likely would require the Power Grid Company of Bangladesh to meet with Indian counterparts to harmonize communications and operational protocols.
Participation in MBED Stakeholder Processes:
If India's MBED evolves to include governance similar to what Section 3.6 describes, Bangladesh would have two avenues of stakeholder input. One includes Bangladesh private companies and state enterprises engaged in MBED as market participants. These entities by nature would represent their private interests, and the government might consider the need for a code of conduct to guide their participation in the stakeholder process. In addition, ministerial or regulatory representation might occur in a council of affected governments ( Figure 6 ). The government of Bangladesh would need to determine which agency would be authorized to represent its public interest in executive matters affecting market design. 10
Demand Response: Demand response (DR) is the ability and willingness of end-use customers to reduce their load at a specific time in response to a price signal. This is one of the hallmarks of a modern power sector and is becoming valuable in markets similar to MBED worldwide. For example, integrated markets often include procedures for allowing DR to provide ancillary services, which can greatly increase DR's opportunities for value. Large end-use customers in Bangladesh could be DR providers. The government could establish DR rules that would both provide domestic value to Bangladesh and lay the foundation for additional value if cross-border DR were to expand under MBED. This would involve foresight into the communications protocol that would likely be required to dispatch DR through MBED, such as automatic generation control along with developing regulations to require testing and validation of performance for DR participants (Chernyakhovskiy 2019) .
Actions Applicable to Integrated Markets and Bilateral Agreements
Switching of Service from a Utility to Another Provider: CBET might enable large customers to replace service from their traditional utility with service arranged by competitive third-party providers. If Bangladesh elects to enact policies to enable switching, the government might need to establish rules to ensure other remaining customers are not harmed economically when a large customer leaves the utility. Typically, if a large customer switches to an alternative provider, they continue to wheel power through existing transmission and distribution lines. As the government of Bangladesh currently established wheeling rates assessed by the Power Grid Company of Bangladesh, additional executive action would likely need to take place to enable this form of power wheeling and determine fee structures. Recent implementation of a similar policy by the Philippines Department of Energy (2019) provides an applicable case study. 11
Reasonably Competitive Pricing: The government might also need authority to investigate whether the prices under a new CBET arrangement are unreasonably high. If a foreign supplier has some ability to control wholesale prices (due to its size in the market or some other, unfair advantage), customers under Bangladesh jurisdiction might need protection against predatory pricing. Besides authority, the government would require sufficient resources to evaluate and mitigate potential market power by a foreign supplier.
Actions Applicable to Integrated Markets, Bilateral Agreements, and Tenant Generation Transmission Siting Approval:
Generally, a regulator's siting authority over new transmission addresses whether a proposed line would be sufficiently used and beneficial to the public. When a line enables CBET, regulators also need to protect customers under their jurisdiction from paying an unfair share of the new costs. To make such a determination, the commission would need authority to compel the release of data and other information it would need to quantify the distribution of benefits between countries.
Reporting Requirements: Regulatory authorities might regularly consider standards for all market participants to report CBET-related outcomes. For example, a BPDB annual report (BPDB 2018) provides detailed disclosures of the cost of generation by fuel source for each utility. Power imports (from long-term CBET power supply agreements) already appear as a line item in this report; however, more-detailed reporting on CBET purchases and sales might be useful if Bangladesh were to participate in MBED. Section 6 has further examples of data that could be useful in monitoring CBET outcomes.
System Planning and Operator Actions
CBET-especially if it eventually involves Bangladesh's participation in India's MBED reforms-would create three areas of resource planning: (1) generation and transmission investments needed to ensure Bangladesh's beneficial participation in CBET, (2) new generation that would not participate in CBET but instead would solely support domestic demand, and (3) distribution system planning. Planning might include joint modeling with regional counterparts, along with participation in regional coordination meetings and trainings.
The government would need some degree of regulatory oversight over system planning. The public interest objective would be to avoid the cost of building new resources if the same service could be acquired from the market at a lower cost. This aim would relate to the government's basic goals of ensuring reliability and keeping rates at just and reasonable levels.
Oversight and Monitoring
Tracking of key metrics can help regulators assess whether CBET outcomes are consistent with legislative intent and the public interest. Government oversight is also important to policing the behaviors of market participants. In this section, we describe some metrics the government of Bangladesh could monitor to assess the effect of CBET policies.
Exchange volumes and wholesale prices are the starting points for regulatory oversight. And other measures are useful in formulating long-term strategy and in anticipating problems before they happen.
Volume of Power Trading
Energy Imported, Energy Exported, and Balance of Exchange (Total MWh): Exchange volumes are the starting point for regulatory oversight. Volumes during the early years of a CBET strategy can reveal how quickly generators and load-serving entities adapt to the new rules. Because the pace of striking deals could vary according to the type of CBET involved (e.g., tenant generation, bilateral contracts, or integrated markets), breaking out exchange volumes by type of arrangement could provide additional visibility into market trends.
Prices
Power Purchase Agreements: Bilateral contract prices negotiated between Bangladesh utilities and independent power producers could provide a benchmark for all other price analyses included in regulatory oversight. Reliable, consistent power purchase agreement price data could be ensured by promulgating rules for reporting that would apply to all generators. Regulators in many countries exercise such authority (e.g., FERC 2002). In most cases, public release of aggregated data can protect contract-specific data that might be sensitive for reasons having to do with competition.
Market Exchange Prices:
Energy market platforms such as the Indian Energy Exchange regularly report on wholesale power exchange prices by region. Besides monitoring prices at state hubs such as West Bengal, authorities might consider conducting a study with Indian power exchanges about tracking bilateral CBET transactions involving Bangladesh.
Market clearing prices for energy (MCPEs):
As India's market reforms evolve, MCPEs will grow in importance as indicators of market performance. The SCED software used by India's Power System Operation Corporation (see Section 3.3) determines these prices for each hour in the day-ahead market, and on a sub-hourly basis in real time. Prices for the zones where CBET occurs will provide highly detailed information about the value of imports and exports. Among the important insights revealed by MCPE analysis:
• Seasonal pricing patterns • Hourly pricing patterns • Same-time differences between injection zones and withdrawal zones, such as the injection of hydropower from Nepal and withdrawal of power into Bangladesh.
Transmission Congestion
Loading on CBET Transmission Paths: One possible effect of increased CBET is more congestion on cross-border transmission paths. This, in turn, could suggest a future need for transmission improvements. One indicator of future congestion is how frequently line flows approach a path's thermal limit. This can be expressed visually as a duration curve-power flow for each hour of the year as a percentage of the path's thermal loading limit, with the values arranged in descending order. Figure 7 illustrates two sample CBET transmission paths, using 75% of the path's thermal limit as an example benchmark. 12 In this example, Path A is used more than Path B and is more likely to be congested with increased CBET. 
Reliability: Reductions in Load Shedding
Reductions in load shedding and other supply-related service disruptions are particularly important for Bangladesh. The government can monitor the reliability impact of CBET by (1) changes in actual incidents of load shedding and (2) modeling reliability metrics such as loss of load expectation.
Number of Load Shedding Hours:
Reductions in the number of load-shedding hours could indicate whether CBET is contributing to greater domestic reliability.
Curtailed Load: This refers to the actual level of demand at the time the curtailment occurs. It is measured on the basis of energy and not capacity. For example, a substation might have a maximum loading capacity of 10 MW but might be serving only 2 MW of load at the time it is interrupted. In this case, the load actually dropped-2 MW-would be a more accurate measure of actual lost load. 12 The path utilization metric can be based on any threshold that is deemed useful. In the United States, for example, the Western Electricity Coordinating Council often compares metrics for three thresholds-75%, 95%, and 99%-to provide a more complete picture of path utilization (WECC 2018 Line loading (% of thermal limit)
Percentage of hours
Path A: Flows are 75% of thermal line limit or higher 20% of the time.
Path B: Flows are never above 75% of thermal limit.
Simulated Loss of Load:
The effect of CBET on reliability can also be simulated. A loss of load expectation, or LOLE, is the number of days that available generation capacity plus imports would not be enough to meet demand. A similar measure, the loss of load probability, or LOLP, is the probability that a load loss event might occur. A relationship between CBET and these loss of load indicators could provide regulators with an estimate of how imports can affect future reliability.
Utilization of Domestic Generation
Capacity Factor (Plant Load Factor): Capacity factors for generator groups aggregated by geography, age of plant, storage capability, and other considerations can provide a more-detailed picture of CBET benefits from the perspective of generators. Such a picture includes analysis of capacity factors by the generator's primary CBET type (e.g., integrated market participation, bilateral trading, or tenant generation). Greater generator use resulting from more CBET could increase investor confidence. This, in turn, could reduce obstacles to financing new projects in Bangladesh. For example, the BPDB reports plant level capacity factors in its 2018 annual report (BPDB 2018) . Data in the report show that several fuel oil and diesel plants operate at capacity factors greater than 50% despite high costs. Power purchased from India and imported over the Baharampur-Bheramara interconnection tended to cost less. Access to the Indian market could allow CBET imports to displace much of these more-costly purchases, while Bangladesh's lessexpensive generators could export at times of low domestic demand and thus operate at higher capacity factors. 13
Summary
CBET can take several forms. Each one requires different preparation and places different demands on policy and regulation. Bilateral trading and participating in an integrated wholesale power market are not mutually exclusive, but policies supporting one are not necessarily applicable to the other. Nor would effective regulation of one model be useful in regulating the other.
A major policy decision before Bangladesh is whether to participate in India's MBED reforms. Though India's market reforms could be a platform to facilitate Bangladesh's national goals (e.g., importing hydropower from Nepal and eliminating load shedding), participation would be far more demanding than a bilateral trading regime would be. Entities in Bangladesh would have to spend at least a year to prepare, and the government would need to decide how to address several sovereignty questions. Both India and Bangladesh would have an interest in ensuring efficiency and fairness, which would require common rules.
An integrated market such as the one contemplated in MBED fundamentally changes the relationship between the public and private sectors. In such a market, the government controls fewer outcomes but takes on a larger oversight role. And it may prosecute more cases of market abuse, fraud, and anticompetitive behavior-actions that seldom arise with cost-of-service regulation of a monopoly utility. For the regulatory agency, participation in an integrated regional market would create special staff needs; in addition to normal expertise in engineering and utility accounting, regulatory authorities would need expertise in applied economics and antitrust law.
Monitoring CBET outcomes could help improve benefits over time and would provide public accountability. This report lists metrics that could be tracked regularly and over time. The ability to quantify benefits could help political acceptance of CBET activity, and wider public scrutiny of the data could discourage fraud.
The technical issues involved in making CBET efficient are unique and may lead to treating it as an area separate from other trade and diplomatic issues. Benefits are at stake for all sides, and as with other traded commodities, the market is likely to produce better results for the public if there are few out-of-market disruptions.
Technical analysis can show the theoretical benefits of integrated markets and CBET, but implementation depends on each country's utility laws and regulatory institutions. Building an integrated power market is complex and often requires regulators to enforce transparency, patience, and careful attention to detail. Because institutional evolution does not necessarily proceed at the same pace in all countries, cooperation among regulators is key to managing the process and ensuring that each country enjoys the full benefits of CBET.
